Chas Freeman on Tiananmen

The Realist Chas Freeman

http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/02/the_realist_chas_freeman.asp

Chas Freeman, who has reportedly been offered and accepted a job as chairman of the National Intelligence Council, offered his take on the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 on a listserv in 2006. Here is the full text of his email to that group:

From: CWFHome@cs.com [mailto:CWFHome@cs.com]
Sent: Friday, May 26, 2006 9:29 PM

I will leave it to others to address the main thrust of your reflection on Eric’s remarks. But I want to take issue with what I assume, perhaps incorrectly, to be yoiur citation of the conventional wisdom about the 6/4 [or Tiananmen] incident. I find the dominant view in China about this very plausible, i.e. that the truly unforgivable mistake of the Chinese authorities was the failure to intervene on a timely basis to nip the demonstrations in the bud, rather than — as would have been both wise and efficacious — to intervene with force when all other measures had failed to restore domestic tranquility to Beijing and other major urban centers in China. In this optic, the Politburo’s response to the mob scene at "Tian’anmen" stands as a monument to overly cautious behavior on the part of the leadership, not as an example of rash action.

For myself, I side on this — if not on numerous other issues — with Gen. Douglas MacArthur. I do not believe it is acceptable for any country to allow the heart of its national capital to be occupied by dissidents intent on disrupting the normal functions of government, however appealing to foreigners their propaganda may be. Such folk, whether they represent a veterans’ "Bonus Army" or a "student uprising" on behalf of "the goddess of democracy" should expect to be displaced with despatch from the ground they occupy. I cannot conceive of any American government behaving with the ill-conceived restraint that the Zhao Ziyang administration did in China, allowing students to occupy zones that are the equivalent of the Washington National Mall and Times Square, combined. while shutting down much of the Chinese government’s normal operations. I thus share the hope of the majority in China that no Chinese government will repeat the mistakes of Zhao Ziyang’s dilatory tactics of appeasement in dealing with domestic protesters in China.

I await the brickbats of those who insist on a politically correct — i.e. non Burkean conservative — view.

Chas

Given Secretary Clinton’s recent comments "that the debate with China over human rights, Taiwan and Tibet cannot be allowed to interfere with attempts to reach consensus on other broader issues," one gets the sense that the Obama administration will be giving the Chinese a free hand to deal with dissent however they see fit.

See also the editorial from WaPo

 

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Quote of the Day

Once people come to believe that house prices never fall, they will buy too much property—and house prices will fall. When they believe that shares always do well in the long run, they will buy too many shares—and the market will do badly for years. When funds believe that diversification always pays, they all invest in the same exotic instruments. Diverse markets suddenly have something in common: the funds that have bought into them.
 
– Economist
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Quote of the Day

"The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as ‘inalienable’ because they were supposed to be independent of all governments, but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them."

– Hannah Arendt

 

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Samuel Huntington, 1927-2008

Samuel Huntington, 1927-2008
by Francis Fukuyama

http://the-american-interest.com/contd/?p=688

It is with great sadness that I note the passing on Christmas eve of Samuel Huntington, long-time teacher, friend, and editorial board member of The American Interest.  I knew Huntington from my final year in graduate school at Harvard, when he had just returned from service in the Carter administration to the Government Department.  He kept up with his former students better than most professors through annual meetings at the Wianno Club on Cape Cod every summer, and through seminars and meetings at the Center for International Affairs which he directed for many years at Harvard.
Huntington was easily the greatest political scientist of his generation.  What was remarkable about his scholarship was the range of topics on which he wrote, and the way that each of his books became a major point of reference within each sub-field:  The Soldier and State for civil-military relations; The Common Defense for defense policy; Political Order in Changing Societies and The Third Wave for comparative poitics; The Clash of Civilizations for international relations; American Politics:  The Promise of Disharmony and Who Are We? for American politics.  Through his own scholarship and through his students he virtually created the subfield of strategic studies, an area that was not seriously researched by most universities until he came along.

Since there are likely to be many testimonials to Sam in the coming days and weeks, I thought I would concentrate on one particular aspect of his scholarship, his work on comparative politics.  Political Order in Changing Societies, first published in 1968, was perhaps the last great effort to build a general theory of political development, and left a profound mark on the entire field.  In 1997, when I was a regular book reviewer for Foreign Affairs, I nominated Political Order as one of the top five books on international politics that had been published in the past 75 years.  Perhaps as a result of this, Sam asked me to write a preface to a new reprint of paperback edition of the book which appeared in 2006.  This was a great honor that I undertook gladly.  I will simply quote from what I said in that preface:

“In order to understand [Political Order]’s intellectual significance, it is necessary to place it in the context of the ideas that were dominant in the 1950s and early 1960s.  This was the heyday of “modernization theory,” probably the most ambitious American attempt to create an integrated, empirical theory of human social change.  Modernization theory had its origins in the works of late nineteenth century European social theorists like Henry Maine, Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Tönnies, and Max Weber.  The writings of these authors established a series of concepts (e.g., status/contract; mechanical/organic solidarity; Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft; charismatic/bureaucratic-rational authority) that sought to describe the changes in social norms and relationships that took place as human societies made the transition from agricultural to industrial production.  While based primarily on the experiences of early modernizers like Britain or the United States, they sought to draw from them general laws of social development.
“European social theory was killed, literally and figuratively, by the two world wars; the ideas it generated migrated to the United States, and were taken up by a generation of American academics after the Second World War at places like Harvard’s Department of Comparative Politics, the MIT Center for International Studies, or the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics.  The Harvard department, led by Weber’s protégé Talcott Parsons, hoped to create an integrated, interdisciplinary social science that would combine economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology.
“The period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s also corresponded to the dissolution of European colonial empires and the emergence of what became known as the third or developing world, newly independent countries with great aspirations to modernize and catch up with their former colonial masters.  Scholars like Edward Shils, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and Walt Whitman Rostow saw these momentous developments as a laboratory for social theory, as well as a great opportunity to help developing countries raise living standards and democratize their political systems.
“Modernization theorists placed a strong normative value on being modern, and in their view, the good things of modernity tended to go together.  Economic development, changing social relationships like urbanization and the breakdown of primary kinship groups, higher and more inclusive levels of education, normative shifts towards values like “achievement” and rationality, secularization, and the development of democratic political institutions, were all seen as an interdependent whole.  Economic development would fuel better education, which would lead to value change, which would promote modern politics, and so on in a virtuous circle.
Political Order in Changing Societies appeared against this backdrop, and frontally challenged these assumptions.  First, Huntington argued that political decay was at least as likely as political development, and that the actual experience of newly independent countries was one of increasing social and political disorder.  Second, he suggested that the good things of modernity often operated at cross purposes.  In particular, if social mobilization outpaced the development of political institutions, there would be frustration as new social actors found themselves unable to participate in the political system.  This led to a condition he labeled praetorianism, and was the leading cause of insurgencies, military coups, and weak or disorganized governments.  Economic development and political development were not part of the same, seamless process of modernization; the latter had its own separate logic as institutions like political parties or legal systems were created or evolved into more complex forms.
“Huntington drew a practical implication from these observations, namely, that political order was a good thing in itself and would not automatically arise out of the modernization process.  Rather the contrary:  without political order, neither economic nor social development could proceed successfully.  The different components of modernization needed to be sequenced.  Premature increases in political participation – including things like early elections – could destabilize fragile political systems.  This laid the groundwork for a development strategy that came to be called the “authoritarian transition,” whereby a modernizing dictatorship provides political order, a rule of law, and the conditions for successful economic and social development.  Once these building blocks were in place, other aspects of modernity like democracy and civic participation could be added.  (Huntington’s student, Fareed Zakaria, would write a book in 2003, The Future of Freedom, making a somewhat updated variant of this argument.)
“The significance of Huntington’s book must be seen against the backdrop of what was happening in U.S. foreign policy at the time it was published.  The year 1968 marked a high water mark in the Vietnam War, when troop strength swelled to half a million and the Tet offensive undermined the U.S. public’s confidence.  Many modernization theorists hoped their academic work would have useful implications for American policy; Walt Rostow’s book The Stages of Economic Growth was a guide for the new U.S. Agency for International Development as it sought to buffer countries like South Vietnam and Indonesia against the appeals of communism.  But by the late 1960s, there were not a lot of success stories that Americans to which could point.  The competing communist and Western nation-building strategies in North and South Vietnam ended with the latter’s eventual defeat.
“Huntington suggested that there was another way forward, through modernizing authoritarianism, a point of view that brought considerable opprobrium on him in the highly polarized context of America in the late-1960s.  But is was exactly this kind of leader – Park Chung-Hee in Korea, Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore, and Suharto in Indonesia – who brought about the so-called “Asian Miracle,” even as Vietnam was going communist.
“It is safe to say that Political Order finally killed off modernization theory.  It was part of a pincer attack, the other prong of which was the critique from the Left that said that modernization theorists enshrined an ethnocentric European or North American model of social development as a universal one for humanity to follow.  American social science found itself suddenly without an overarching theory, and began its subsequent slide into its current methodological Balkanization.”

Political Order in Changing Societies was one of Huntington’s earlier works, and one that established his stature as a political scientist, but it far from his last major contribution to comparative politics.  His work on democratic transition also became of a point of reference in the period after the end of the Cold War.  Ironically, this stream of writing began with a 1984 article in Political Science Quarterly entitled “Will More Countries Become Democratic?”  Surveying the situation following the Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American democratic transitions of the 1970s and early 1980s, Huntington made the case that the world was not likely to see more shifts from authoritarianism in the near future given inauspicious structural and international conditions.  This was written, of course, a mere five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall.  He shifted gears quickly after the collapse of communism, however, and wrote The Third Wave, a book that gave the name to the entire period.
The Third Wave’s take on democratization was, however, different from many others in the field, who focused either on agency (as in the Schmitter-O’Donnell-Whitehead series) or on structural conditions for democratic stability (as in the tradition running from Lipset through Pzreworksi).  Sam noted that the vast bulk of Third Wave transitions had occurred in culturally Christian countries, and that there was a distinct religious underpinning to the pattern of democratization in the late 20th century.  The Catholic world, in particular, was catching up to the Protestant first movers, just as Catholic societies had come late to the capitalist revolution.  The Third Wave was not, however, a manifestation of a broader cross-cultural modernization process that would eventually encompass all societies, but one rooted in a particular set of cultural values inherited from Western Christianity.
Though it may not have been obvious at the time, The Third Wave anticipated by this argument many of the themes that would be reprised in much greater detail in The Clash of Civilizations and Who Are We?, as well as in the volume that he and Larry Harrison edited entitled Culture Matters.  In perhaps an even deeper rebuff to modernization theory than the one made famous in Political Order, Huntington believed deeply in the durability of cultural values and the primacy of religion as a shaper of both national political development and international relations.  In the face of this, globalization was a superficial force that created the thinnest veneer of cosmopolitan “Davos men,” and would not in the end guarantee peace or prosperity.  And the United States did not represent the vanguard of a universalizing democratic movement; rather, it was successful due to its origins as an “Anglo-Protestant” society.  His last scholarly efforts prior to his passing focused on the impact of religion on world politics.
I disagreed with Sam on many of these issues.  While I fully appreciate the power and durability of culture, and the way that modern liberal democracy was rooted in Christian cultural values, it has always seemed to me that culture was more useful in explaining the provenance than the durability of democracy as a political system.  Sam, in my view, underrated the universalism of the appeal of living in modern, free societies with accountable governments.  His argument rests heavily on the view that modernization and Westernization are two completely separate processes, something which I rather doubt.  The gloomy picture he paints of a world riven by cultural conflict is one favored by the Islamists and Russian nationalists, but is less helpful in explaining contemporary China or India, or indeed in explaining the motives of people in the Muslim world or Russia who are not Islamists or nationalists.  Nation-states and not civilizations remain the primary actors in world politics, and they are motivated by a host of interests and incentives that often override inherited cultural predispositions.
Be that as it may, Sam’s arguments were always made with great force, erudition, and persuasiveness.  Even if one disagreed with him, it was impossible to not take his arguments with the greatest seriousness.  They provided vocabulary and structure to all subsequent discussions of the topic, whether latter was American politics, defense policy, democratic transition, or American identity.  In addition to his written work, he was a great teacher, and produced an entire generation of students who have reshaped virtually all of the sub-fields of political science.  From his earliest writings to his last works, he has drawn vociferous critics, but that is the mark of a scholar who has important and fundamental things to say.  It is a safe bet that we won’t see his like for some time to come.

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The Embrace of Stalinism

 

Arseny Roginsky, 16 – 12 – 2008

 
Why is Russia romanticising the memory of Stalinism, enquires Memorial’s founder Arseny Roginsky, when its defining feature was the use of terror? 
 

The memory of Stalinism in contemporary Russia raises problems which are painful and sensitive. There is a vast amount of pro-Stalinist literature on the bookstalls: fiction, journalism and pseudo-history. In sociological surveys, Stalin invariably features among the first three "most prominent figures of all times". In the new school history textbooks, Stalinist policy is interpreted in a spirit of justification. 

There are also hundreds of crucial volumes of documents, scholarly articles and monographs on Stalinism. The achievements of these historians and archivists is unquestionable. But if they do have any influence on the mass consciousness, it is too weak. The means of disseminating the information have not been there, and nor in recent years has the political will. However, the deepest problem lies in the current state of our national historical memory of Stalinism.

I should explain what I mean here by historical memory, and Stalinism. Historical memory is the retrospective aspect of collective consciousness. It informs our collective identity through our selection of the past we find significant. The past, real or imaginary, is the material with which it works: it sorts through the facts and systemizes them,  selecting those which it is prepared to present as belonging to the genealogy of its identity.

Stalinism is a system of state rule, the totality of specific political practices of the Stalinist leadership. Throughout the duration of this system, a number of characteristic features were preserved. But its generic feature (which arose from the very beginning of Bolshevist rule and did not disappear with Stalin’s death) is terror as a universal instrument for solving any political and social tasks. It was state violence and terror that made possible the centralization of rule, the severing of regional ties, high vertical mobility; the harsh introduction of an ideology which could be easily modified, a large army of subjects of slave labor, and many other things.

Thus, the memory of Stalinism is primarily the memory of state terror as the defining feature of the age. It is also what links it in so many respects with today.  

Victims, not crimes

Is that really what the memory of Stalinism means in today’s Russia? I’d like to say a few words about the key features of this memory today. Firstly, the memory of Stalinism in Russia is almost always the memory of victims. Victims, not crimes. As the memory of crimes it does not register, as there is no consensus on this.

To a great extent this is because popular consciousness has nothing to hold onto from a legal point of view. The state has produced no legal document which recognizes state terror as a crime. The two lines in the preamble to the 1991 law on the rehabilitation of victims is clearly insufficient. There are no legal decisions that inspire any confidence – and there have not been any trials against participants of the Stalinist terror in the new Russia, not a single one.  

There are other reasons too.

We killed our own people

When popular consciousness has to come to terms with historical tragedies, it does so by assigning roles of Good and Evil. People identify themselves with one of the roles. It is easier to identify oneself with Good, i.e. with an innocent victim, or better still with a heroic battle against Evil.

Incidentally, this is why our Eastern European neighbors, from Ukraine to Poland and the Baltic States have no serious problems with coming to terms with the Soviet period of history, while in Russia, people identify themselves with victims or fighters, or with both at the same time. Whether or not this has anything to do with history is quite another matter – we’re talking about memory, not knowledge.  

It is even possible to identify oneself with Evil, as the Germans did (not without help from the outside), in order to distance oneself from this evil: "Yes, unfortunately we did that, but we’re not like than anymore and we’ll never be like that again".

But what can we do, living in Russia?

In the Soviet terror, it is very difficult to distinguish the executioners from the victims. For example, secretaries of regional committee in August 1937 all wrote death sentences by the bundle, but by November 1938 half of them had already been shot themselves.

In national, and particularly regional memory, the "executioners" – for example, the regional committee secretaries of 1937 – are not unambiguously evil: yes, they signed execution warrants, but they also organized the construction of kindergartens and hospitals, and went to workers’ cafeterias personally to test the food, while their subsequent fate is worthy of sympathy.

And one more thing: unlike the Nazis, who mainly killed "foreigners": Poles, Russians, and German Jews (who were not quite their "own" people), we mainly killed our own people, and our consciousness refuses to accept this fact.

In remembering the terror, we are incapable of assigning the main roles, incapable of putting the pronouns "we" and "they" in their places. This inability to assign evil is the main thing that prevents us from being able to embrace the memory of the terror properly. This makes it far more traumatic. It is one of the main reasons why we push it to the edge of our historical memory.

The search for a Great Russia

At a certain level, that of personal recollections, the terror is also a passing memory. There are still witnesses, but they are the last of their kind, and they are dying, taking with them the personal memories and experiences.

This leads on to my next point: memory as recollection is succeeded by memory as a selection of collective images of the past. These are no longer formed by personal, and not even family memories, but by various socio-cultural means. One significant element in determining this is the politics of history, ie the attempts of the political elite to form an image of the past that suits it.

Since the 1990s those in political power have been looking to the past to justify their own legitimacy. But if the government craved legitimacy after the collapse of the USSR, people craved identity. And both the government and the population looked for a way to make up for these in the image of a Great Russia, of which present-day Russia is the successor. The images of the "bright past", which the government proposed in the 1990s – Stolypin, Peter the Great and so on – were not accepted by the population: they are too remote, not closely enough related to the present day. Gradually and insidiously, the concept of Great Russia came to mean the Soviet period as well, particularly the Stalinist era.

The post-Yeltsin leadership saw that people were ready for another reconstruction of the past, and made full use of it. I do not mean to say that the government of the first decade of the 21st century intended to rehabilitate Stalin. It just wants to offer its fellow citizens the notion of a great country, one which is timelessly great, one which overcomes all ordeals with honor. The image of a happy and glorious past was needed to consolidate the population, to restore the continuity of the authority of state power, to strengthen its own "vertical" etc. But whatever the intention, against the background of the newly arisen panorama of a great power, which as ever is "surrounded by a ring of enemies", the whiskered profile of the great leader showed through. This result was inevitable and predictable.

The two images of the Stalinist era were in harsh contradiction. There was that of Stalinism, of a criminal regime responsible for decades of state terror. And there was that of an era of glorious victories and great achievements. Above all, of course, there was the image of the main victory -victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Conflicting memories of the Great Patriotic War

The memory of Stalinism and the memory of the war. The memory of the war became the foundation on which national self-identification was re-organized. A great deal has been written on this topic. I would only note one thing: what is currently called the memory of the war does not quite correspond to its name. The memory of the hardships of the war, of everyday life, of 1941, of imprisonment, evacuation, and the victories of war – this memory was extremely anti-Stalinist in the Khrushchev era. It was organically intertwined with the memory of the terror.

Today the memory of the war has been replaced by the memory of Victory. This change began in the mid-1960s. At the end of the 1960s, the memory of the terror was banned – for a whole 20 years! By the time this changed, there were virtually no soldiers left, and there was no one left to correct the collective stereotype with their personal recollections.

The memory of victory without the memory of the price of victory cannot, of course, be anti-Stalinist. So it does not fit in well with the memory of the terror. To simplify drastically, this conflict of memories goes like this: if state terror was a crime, then who was the criminal? The state? Stalin as the head of state? But we won the war against Absolute Evil, and so we were not the subjects of a criminal regime, but a great country, the embodiment of everything good in the world. It was under the rule of Stalin that we overcame Hitler. Victory means the Stalinist era, and the terror means the Stalinist era. It is impossible to reconcile these two images of the past, except by rejecting one of them, or at least making serious corrections to it.

And this is what happened – the memory of the terror receded. It has not disappeared completely, but it has been pushed to the periphery of people’s consciousness.

The intention is not to idealise Stalin. This is the natural side-effect of resolving a completely different task – that of confirming the idea of the indubitable correctness of state power. The government is higher than any moral or legal assessments. It is above the law, as it is guided by state interests that are higher than the interests of the person and society, higher than morality and law. The state is always right – at least as long as it can deal with its enemies. This idea runs through the new textbooks from beginning to end, and not only where repressions are discussed.

Conclusion: our historical memory is divided, fragmentary, passing away. It has been pushed to the periphery of popular consciousness. Those who hold onto the memory of Stalinism in the sense that we use these words are very much in the minority today. Whether or not this memory can become embedded nationwide; what information and what values need to assimilated by popular consciousness, what needs to be done here – this is the topic for another discussion. Clearly, society and the state need to work together on this. Clearly, historians have a special role in this process. They bear a special responsibility.

This paper was read at a conference on the History of Stalinism in Moscow on 5 December 2008

 
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The new liberal imperialism

The new liberal imperialism

Robert Cooper

guardian.co.uk, Sunday 7 April 2002 12.14 BST
 
 
In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance-of-power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. September 11 showed us one of the implications of the change.
 

To understand the present, we must first understand the past, for the past is still with us. International order used to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together – and it is the essence of empires that they are diverse – usually requires an authoritarian political style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability. Historically, empires have generally been static.

In Europe, a middle way was found between the stasis of chaos and the stasis of empire, namely the small state. The small state succeeded in establishing sovereignty, but only within a geographically limited jurisdiction. Thus domestic order was purchased at the price of international anarchy. The competition between the small states of Europe was a source of progress, but the system was also constantly threatened by a relapse into chaos on one side and by the hegemony of a single power on the other. The solution to this was the balance-of-power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which became seen as the condition of liberty in Europe. Coalitions were successfully put together to thwart the hegemonic ambitions firstly of Spain, then of France, and finally of Germany.

But the balance-of-power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass society and democratic politics, rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance-of-power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalistic, moralist spirit of the late twentieth century.

The second half of the twentieth Century has seen not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French , British and finally Soviet Empires are now no more than a memory. This leaves us with two new types of state: first there are now states – often former colonies – where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist a ‘premodern’ zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan). Second, there are the post imperial, postmodern states who no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional "modern" states who behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d’ètat (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China).

The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages. The CFE Treaty, under which parties to the treaty have to notify the location of their heavy weapons and allow inspections, subjects areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. It is important to realise what an extraordinary revolution this is. It mirrors the paradox of the nuclear age, that in order to defend yourself, you had to be prepared to destroy yourself. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of distrust and concealment. Mutual vulnerability has become mutual transparency.

The main characteristics of the postmodern world are as follows:

· The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.

· Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance.

· The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour.

· The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites.

· Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.

The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the postmodern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the postmodern world, raison d’ètat and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war.

While such a system does deal with the problems that made the balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state. While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.

What is the origin of this basic change in the state system? The fundamental point is that "the world’s grown honest". A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and postmodern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the Western powers.

If this is true, it follows that we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half century of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that Western European countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless, played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position. NATO’s most valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is a massive intra-western confidence-building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents a quality and stability of political relations never known before.

The EU is the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a transnational than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation-state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.

European states are not the only members of the postmodern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a postmodern state; Japan is by inclination a postmodern state, but its location prevents it developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do. Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for a postmodern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.

Within the postmodern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world , following Clausewitz’ dictum war is an instrument of policy in the postmodern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the postmodern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.

The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the postmodern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation.

The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state.

The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time. Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state’s monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The premodern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the postmodern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using premodern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light.

How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.

What form should intervention take? The most logical way to deal with chaos, and the one most employed in the past is colonisation. But colonisation is unacceptable to postmodern states (and, as it happens, to some modern states too). It is precisely because of the death of imperialism that we are seeing the emergence of the pre-modern world. Empire and imperialism are words that have become a form of abuse in the postmodern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia: the one has achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.

All the conditions for imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth – all of this seems eminently desirable.

What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.

Postmodern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theology today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the postmodern world has also opened itself up.)

The second form of postmodern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce. It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to it – are over a hundred NGOs.

One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime – which is what state collapse usually amounts to. But Usama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.

The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no one is imposing anything. Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given – a whole mass of laws and regulations – as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be describes as a cooperative empire. ‘Commonwealth’ might indeed not be a bad name.

The postmodern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A cooperative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the postmodern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.

That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the premodern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left.

· Robert Cooper is a senior serving British diplomat, and writes in a personal capacity. This article is published as The post-modern state in the new collection Reordering the World: the long term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre.

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2008年度最雷人语录

欢迎补充!

1、“对我的抹黑,就是对西丰的抹黑,…请管好你的嘴!不要乱讲”
--2008年1月7日,做出进京捉记者壮举的西丰县委书记张志国在西丰人论坛里发帖说。随后张书记被“责令辞职”,11月,张被发现已荣任沈铁轻轨办的副总指挥,负责具体工作。再随后,在舆论压力下,张再次丢官.

2、“我们不采取措施,是对全县人民不负责任。”
--辽宁省西丰县政法委书记周静宇,对县委书记张志国派警察入京捉拿女记者的评价(据《中国青年报》《新京报》)。女记者朱文娜之前曾采写报道《辽宁西丰:一场官商较量》。

3、“现在不是讨论事情真相的时候,这个事件现在已经很混乱了,而且已经上升到学校声誉,甚至是国家安全的地步了。”
——中国政法大学教授杨帆(男)在课堂上与一女生恶语相向并发生肢体冲突,事件发生后杨帆对媒体如是说。(二可气推荐)

4、“我竟然把它们(伪造的自己与国家领导人的合影)印到书的扉页上,真是鬼使神差,只图虚名,招来了大祸。”
--临汾市委常委、临汾宣传部长王月喜在法庭上痛苦的反思着(民主拉登推荐)。

5、“这话只有全国人大代表可以说,省人大代表不能说。我们都听不见”
--2008年1月23日,当过省三届人大代表的梁宝煜屡次打断全国人大代表李永忠的尖锐发言,并拂袖而去。事后他解释“我只是出去抽支烟而已”

6、“以前没有网络的时候多好啊,想让他们怎么说就怎么说。”
—–《南方人物周刊》记者回访陕西绥德校长找县长签字被拘事件,采访受阻,接待记者的绥德宣传部长说出这样的话,同时他还感慨:“以前不来报道我们绥德的大好形势,现在一出这事你们就过来,这不是给我们的工作添乱吗?”。(网友二可气推荐)

7、“看病最不难是中国,看病最不贵是中国。…是人们的价值观念问题。”
---2008.2.18,广州市卫生局副局长曾其毅说。(新快报)

8、“郭副主席说的一些情况…既违背事实又违背常识。…这次抗灾斗争的胜利是…一次壮举,是社会主义制度优越性的充分体现”
---2008年2月19日,铁道部新闻发言人王勇平回应广州政协副主席郭锡龄对铁道路的批评时说。他同时反驳郭:“从来就没听说过铁道部从长江以北调过任何一台内燃机车到广州地区参与救灾”。但之前的1月31日王曾发言:“像当年支援淮海战役一样,集中全路力量以最快的速度从北京、郑州…等铁路局紧急调集大量内燃机车、客车和大批人员驰援广铁。”

9、“我们市委、市政府在党中央国务院、省委、省政府、广州军区、解放军武警还有全市人民的共同关心支持下,上级领导指挥之下,铁道部的全力配合之下,硬是在年三十之前年二十九把滞留在广州的旅客全部送走。这就是奇迹,这就是社会主义制度的优越性,其他国家不可能发生的事情就发生在中国!”
---2008.2.20,广州市委常委、宣传部长王晓玲评价雪灾期间广州政府的表现。

10、“这两个企业均是日本在华设立的独资企业,生产过程完全按照日方的标准工艺进行管理和生产,并由日方公司人员负责驻厂监管。”
--2008年2月22日,中国输日包子在日本被检出农药残留一事,日方认为责任在中国企业,国家质检总局则回应说这些企业都是日本独资、日本工艺、日本人监管。几天后,公安部表示毒源“发生在中国境内的可能性极小”,否认了这两家企业出问题的可能性。

11、“中方多次表示,中国人民享有广泛的人权和宗教信仰的自由。”
--2008年2月26日,外长杨洁篪说。

12、“‘钉子户’为了他个人的利益,损害了包括开发商在内的多数人的利益!这也是房价上涨的原因之一。”
--2008年3月4日,全国政协委员、北京某房地产公司老总穆麒茹十一届政协会议上发言。

13、“对于所谓垄断要科学界定,电信业固话业务、移动业务都有竞争,怎么能算垄断企业呢?当然不是。”
--2008两位期间全国政协委员、国资委副主任王瑞祥表示。

14、“政府不应害怕上访而牺牲富人利益。许多地方政府官员为了息事宁人,要求财力较强的一方当事人牺牲自身合法利益,来满足这些上访者的诸多不合理要求。”
--2008年3月11日,参加“两会”的全国政协委员、祈福集团董事长彭磷基说。(三户王勤提供)

15、“世界上很多西方人因为精神空虚,压力大,开始信奉藏传佛教,瑜伽,印度教等等,……宗教不能当饭吃,但可以被利用来进行奴隶式的剥削……”
---2008年4月10日,自己也经常练瑜珈的搜狐老板张朝阳在博客里写道。

16、“去年,全市空气质量属优或良的天数为333天。”
--2008年4月13日,广州市环保局如此宣布,此前,该局承认“去年广州灰霾天数131天”。两者相加,广州一年有464天。

17.“一是要以法律的规定为依据;二是要以治安总体状况为依据;三是要以社会和人民群众的感觉为依据。”
—-最高人民法院院长王胜俊4月10日解释判死刑的依据

18.“什么,两三天就能吃到一顿米饭?”
—2008年4月10日,南方都市报记者在凉山采访童工马海布的母亲时表示,“你儿子在那边很可怜,两三天才能吃到一顿米饭”。但这位前几秒钟还在为儿子失踪而痛哭的母亲,闻听此言竟一脸惊喜地如此表示

19.没有监测到地震
—-2008年5月12日,四川汶川地震,上海震感明显,该市不少写楼白领通过逃生通道,走出高楼。但东方网记者事后致电佘山地震台和上海地震局时,工作人员都做如此表示。

20.“死亡数字各个部门有不同的口径,对这些数字我们不必过于较真。”
—2008年5月12日晚,央视主持人在主播汶川大地震时,打断连线记者的话如此说道。

21、“地震未必是坏事,比如去年岷县地震,震后盖的房子就很漂亮嘛”
--5.12四川大地震后,甘肃省委书记陆浩“第一时间”赶到甘肃灾区,发表重要讲话时如是说。

22、“同志,你要知道,倒塌的可不仅仅是学校,北川县民政局整栋大楼都倒了啊!”
--2008年5月13日,汶川地震第二天记者招待会上,记者提问为何倒塌的大部分是学校,民政部救灾司司长痛心地回答。(rouge 推荐)

23、“我局编辑在信息编辑过程中出现技术失误,导致内容有误”
---5月23日,甘肃地震局在一条仅限给网友的道歉信中如是说。此前的5月20日,甘肃省委书记陆浩曾说“在震前就对这次地震的趋势做过预测,并向省委、省政府做过报告”

24、“你这是我们中国人的耻辱”
--2008年6月初,深圳华强北某商场保安用皮带抽打一个女小偷,并迫其拍下裸露胸部的视频,期间保安如此指责小偷。

25、“关你屁事”
--汶川地震期间,成都市区有自称“有关系”的人在救灾专用帐蓬里搓麻将,市民报警后一女警对围观市民如是说。

27、“纵做鬼,也幸福”
--2008年6月6日,王兆山(山东作协副主席)在《齐鲁晚报》发表词“江城子 废墟下的自述”,词以废墟下遇难者的口吻,感叹党国赐与的幸福。

28、“我们不能认定他们应该负什么责任,因为他们认为照片中的老虎是真,而不是说虎照是真的。”
--2008年6月29日,华南虎事件官方调查组回应“如何处理公开挺假的学者专家”时说。

29、“对待刁民政府要硬气,不要被刁民挟持。”
——2008年6月,龙永图在广州出席公园化战略研讨会谈到“最牛钉子户”时,如是说。

30、“不用去现场调查就知道那里的情况,因为我是专家。”
--2008年7月6日,在央视《新闻调查》的采访中,中科院水利部研究员张信宝如此说,他同时指责汶川人想异地重建是“逃跑行为”,因为“汶川安全得很”。

31、“别忘了你们是中国人”
--2008年8月,聂卫平置疑郎平等执教于外国运动队的中国籍教练。

32、“你奋斗了二十多年,参加了四届奥运会,而只获得了一枚铜牌,你觉得你有愧祖国吗”
—-2008年8月京奥,央视记者采访获得50米手枪慢射铜牌的谭宗亮时,问道。

33、“(三聚氰胺)也不是一个毒性很高的物质,所以即使婴幼儿服用了三聚氰胺含量较低的奶粉,家长们也不用过于担心。”
--2008年9月17日,中国疾病控制中心营养与食品安全所研究员李宁说。此时全国至少已有3例死亡患儿和6244名诊断病例。

34、“曹局长主要还是想节约用钱,人事局花钱很紧张的,修房子等还有欠账。”
--2008年9月19日,四川剑阁县人事局局长曹正直酒后殴打63岁长者,事后其同事、人事局党支部委员、办公室主任袁术健如此解释。

35、“媒体公布的现场视频资料和公安机关掌握的现场视频资料是一致的,没有经过任何拼凑和剪辑。”
—-2008年10月18日,在哈尔滨六警打死人的新闻发布会上,哈市公安局副局长卢洪喜说。一周后,警方却向外公布了完整版录像,比之先前多出11分钟录像。

36、“你们算个屁啊…你知道我是谁吗?我是北京交通部派下来的,级别和你们市长一样高,敢跟我斗!”。
—–2008年10月28日,深圳海事局党组书记、副局长林嘉祥欲将1名11岁女童拖进洗手间内猥亵,当女孩父母找其讲理时,林书记如是说。

37、“我们政府对食品的监管力度,绝对是全世界的第一!”
--2008年10月,中国工程院院士陈君石在凤凰世纪大讲堂上如是说。

38 “成品油价格与国际油价实时联动背后的潜台词是价格一步到位,与国际油价接轨。但中国是发展中国家,什么价格都与国际接轨,这不太现实。”
--2008年11月24日,在国际油价大幅下跌的背景下,国家发改委能源研究所所长韩文科如此说。但年初当国际油价大涨时,该专家曾表示:“目前我国的成品油价格形成机制…要进一步与国际市场接轨,加快价格的传导作用,进一步发挥市场对油品供需的调节。”

39、“我想你应该是一个成熟的成年人了吧?”
--2008年11月25日,有记者问外交部发言人秦刚对美国一张名为《中国民主》的音乐专辑的看法,秦如此反问记者。(FlyingMonkey 推荐)

40、“现在有不良的社会舆论导向,轻轻松松学语文,愉快学数学,这是从国外传过来的,…我们有我们自己教育的历史,有我们的文化传统,……而不是在快乐中学习,在快乐中获得成绩。任何改革不是把优良传统改革掉…”
――2008年11月10日,广东高考改革项目主持人李伟成说。

41、“为了让表演显得更加的真实,我们给一只训练有素、屡次立功的警犬,绑上了真实的炸弹;在镜头前,它奔跑着被炸成了碎片……多年来训练和培养该犬的那战士,看到如此真实的镜头后,哭得死去活来…”
--2008年5月,导演姚守岗在CCTV6“流金岁月”节目中说。

42、“因为舱门外的气压巨大,但只要打开了一点点,让舱内的气压逐渐提升,慢慢就能容易打开整个舱门。”
—2008年12月8日,航天英雄翟志在香港解释“为何他(在太空中)打开舱门时显得那么困难”时,如此说.

43 “你们将来受了处分,吊销了你们的记者证,你们不要后悔!”
—山西省太原市杏花岭区检察院检察长何书生对记者说.

43 “现在我们的人均寿命比30年前大大提高,60岁退休,活到90岁,吃30年养老保险,说不过去啊。”
——11月6日广州日报报道,经济学家、原社科院经济研究所所长赵人伟表示职工应该65岁后退休。 (zuozhi推荐)

44 当刘做到第三个俯卧撑的时候,听到李树芬大声说‘我走了’,便跳下河中……”
—2008年7月1日晚,贵州省省公安厅对“瓮安6.28严重打砸抢烧突发性事件新闻发布会”上的说明(北天\小哥推荐)

45 “公安机关依法打击一批,精神司法鉴定治疗一批,集中办班培训管教一批”。
—-2008年新泰县政务网上的一篇官方文章,在总结“怎么依法处置信访工作”时这样写道。(黎明推荐)

46 可以考虑让市民每个月买20块钱的生态基金”。
—-2008年11月,中科院院士蒋有绪呼吁政府开征呼吸税.(染香/章立凡推荐)

47  “省卫生厅干部殴打志愿者与事实不符,纯属谣言”。
—-2008年5月26日,四川省卫生厅厅长沈骥如此说.同日深夜,四川省卫生厅通报,已责成行凶者、该厅干部张建新作出检讨和深刻反省。当晚,张建新已写出了“检讨下午并致歉书”。(章立凡推荐) 

48  “依靠党委和政府的帮助,自己家盖起了新房,生活也都有了保障。”
—-2008年1月12日,HU总前往淮河蓄洪区视察,村民郑继超对HU总如此说.网上检索“郑继超”得知,这位农民大叔短短三个月内已经受到了省、市、县各级领导的五次慰问和两拨记者的采访,是名副其实的“慰安专业户”。 (章立凡推荐)

49  打开美国媒体完全找不到对1968年美国黑人暴动的辱骂;打开英国媒体也找不到对英国大革命的辱骂;打开法国媒体同样找不到对法国大革命和五月风暴的辱骂;唯独中国媒体30年来片刻不停地充斥着对文革的辱骂.
—–2008年12月,北大中文系副教授孔庆东说.(章立凡推荐)

50 “政府赔不少钱呢!”
——2008年元旦前一天,HU总视察某廉租房小区时承诺,党和政府会进一步帮助他们,低保户高会来闻讯激动地如此回答。HU总立即圆场说:“党和政府就是为人民服务的,为人民办事是我们应该做的!”(zuozhi推荐)

51  “对于开发商低于成本价销售楼盘,下一步将和物价部门一起对其进行查处,以防止烂尾楼的出现。”
—–2008年12月10日,南京市江宁区房产局局长周久耕说.(章立凡推荐)

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(旧文重读)The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948

On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."

PREAMBLE

    Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

    Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

    Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

    Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

    Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

    Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

    Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

    All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

    Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

    Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

    No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

    No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

    Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

    All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

    Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

    Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

    (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

    (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

    (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

    (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

    (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

    (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

    (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

    (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

    (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

    (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

    (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

    (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

    (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

    Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

    Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

    (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

    (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

    (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

    (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

    (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

    Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

    (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

    (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

    (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

    (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

    Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

    (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

    (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

    (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

    (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

    (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

    (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

    (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

    Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

    (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

    (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

    (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

    Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

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中国奇迹的源头与动力何在?

中国奇迹的源头与动力何在?

http://www.ftchinese.com/story_print.php?storyid=001023524

1988年秋,在改革10年之际,我们写过一篇长文。文章开头说,“改革、开放给中国带来了历史性的变化。这一点现在恐怕很少有人怀疑了。 8亿农民开始卷入商品经济生活的历史性变迁,国民生产总值连续10年以年平均9.3%速度的增长,改革开放带来的中国人均福利水平的提高,为中国赢得了国际性的声誉。

“尽管如此(也许正因为如此),中国改革较早地陷入了举步为艰的困境。‘英雄时代’过后的解放情绪逐渐被‘摸着石头过河’的失落感所代替。西方文化的进入激起了对传统文化的反思甚至厌恶,原有价值评价标准的混乱没有解决,而且似乎加剧了。同时,通货膨胀压力的不断增强,社会腐败因素的恶性膨胀,收入不公平和机会不均等的急剧发展,农民的初步进入造成的社会生活空间令人压抑的拥挤,统统汇成了种种说得清和说不清的社会不满。……所有这些都暗示着,中国改革经过10年的匆匆行进,现在正处于一个关键性的历史转折关头。”在文章的末尾,我们总结10年改革的基本战略是正确的,社会主义的改革并未走到尽头,中国的文化并未预先注定中华民族向现代化转变中将再次磨难,中国人只要克服焦躁情绪,选择正确的战略转折,是可以避免动乱或停滞的前景,而争取腾飞的前途。

30年的最大成就

后来的发展表明,历史并不是简单地选择了一个路径,从1989年起,中国经过一个短暂的动荡,稍稍的停滞和迟疑,然后迅速走上了腾飞的大道。

改革开放30年最大的成就,国内外的观察者都很少有分歧,就是中国持续30年的经济高速增长,使中国从一个人均国民收入199美元贫困的低收入国家,走到了人均GDP2360美元这个中等偏低收入国家入门的门槛。同样甚至更加重要的是,这种经济增长,改善了几乎所有人的生活和福利水平,而并不是只惠及少数人。迄今为止,中国避免了许多发展中国家的停滞陷井或在经济增长期所出现的那种社会两极化的大规模对抗和动荡。亿万中国农民,在继续保有中国历史上最平均的土地使用和收益权的同时,通过进城打工,普遍显著改善了收入和生活水平。无论农村本身还是城市居民的基尼系数,大体上围绕0.35的水平在波动,仍然属于比较平均的收入分配差距。

那么,中国为什么取得了这样的经济奇迹?人们给出了不同的回答。主流的说法是说因为中国实行了对外开放,搞了市场经济,从而搞对了激励。界定了产权包括私有产权,这当然很有道理。不过,搞开放式的市场经济的发展中国家太多了,为什么独独中国有这样的经济成功?况且要说私有产权界定,许多发展中国家比中国还要彻底的多,搞市场经济也没有那么多框框禁忌,为什么他们几乎很难与中国相提并论?当然也有人说,在东亚模式里中国并非绝无仅有,与经济起飞时期的亚洲四小龙相比,除了规模大,中国也无特别。但大国外向型经济成功,本身就是奇迹。同时这种说法隐含着一个未加证明的判断:中国延续了30年的高速增长也会马上结束,因为可比的东亚国家和地区的经济起飞期一般最长也只有20——30年。如果真是如此,那么中国显然面临更大的问题:为什么过去高速增长的动力已经耗尽,中国又将如何面对一个不同时期的挑战?

四大原因

要回答这些问题,我们首先需要找出中国在过去30年经济高速增长同时又使社会普遍受惠的真正原因。在我们看来,这大体上有以下四方面:

一、在确保自我主权的前提下实现了全方位的对外开放,因此充分利用了中国的后发优势和相对比较优势。

对外开放对中国的推动作用并不下于改革,这是很多人的感慨和共识。从文革后中国的极度封闭和与现代经济社会的巨大差距起步,中国人实行了坚决而又有步骤的对外开放。中国进出口贸易的对外依存度,从只占GDP的10%以下,到65%以上,只是一个标志性的指标。发达国家资金、技术、设备、管理制度与经验乃至各种信息的全面涌入,对当时中国社会所起的振聋发聩的催化作用无论怎么估计也不会过高。因此,说中国30年的经济奇迹主要得益于利用了后发优势和相对比较优势,肯定没有什么错。同时应当看到,从文革后的统治经济和思想禁锢,只经过短短的30年,中国就极大地缩小了与世界发达国家的惊人差距,没有导致自身的迷失、瘫痪、分裂或解体,而是大大地增强了自己的民族自尊心和自豪感,在很多方面已经具备了和发达国家交流和对话的能力,这绝不是一个简单和无保留的开放能够做到的。这里至少包含了两个最重要的机制设计。一个是对外开放特区的陆续设立和发展,使得开放能够既大胆放手又有梯度的扩散和传导,二是本国对经济命脉的垄断和控制,从而保证了对外开放的国家主权和民族利益最大化的导向。

二、坚定然而又是渐进的市场化和有限私有化提供了持续改善的激励和资源配置,避免了国民经济的家族寡头化和大规模的社会对抗。

中国的市场化改革没有采用激进的“休克”疗法,一下子取消或废止计划体制,而是承认计划经济的现实和存在合理性,采用了放调结合、双轨推进的途径,逐步发展市场经济和转化计划体制,因而避免了许多国家在经济转型过程中的中断、混乱和经济滑坡,保持了一个持续高速发展的增长趋势。市场经济激发了个人和企业的创新能力和去满足任何能带来经济收益的社会需求的动力,从而迅速带来了供给充裕、经济繁荣和社会富硕。中国的私有产权的发展也是经历了个体户经济、家庭私有财产的发展、扩大和普遍化、承包经营、股份有限公司和私营资本经济的渐次发展阶段,使得社会有一个认识、适应和调整的过程。

同时特别重要的是,中国的市场化和私有产权的发展,始终保持了混合经济的形态,就是市场领域和政府干预和调控的领域并存,私有产权与公有产权并存,从而保证了宏观的可控性和稳定性,避免了社会的分裂和对抗。中国一方面允许和鼓励私人资本发展,另一方面又保证国有资本对国民经济关键领域的控制,同时通过废除官员的终身制和世袭倾向以及持续不懈地反腐败努力,比较成功地扼制了中上层政府官员将国有资产大规模转化为私人或家族资本的企图,使国家的经济命脉没有落入家族寡头的手中,避免了国家层面的经济家族化或官商勾结的演变,而这在一个血缘关系传统深厚、法治薄弱的发展中国家,本来是经济自由化过程中最容易出现,从而导致社会对抗和动荡、经济增长中断的陷井。

三、基于既得的城乡二元化经济结构,通过统分结合的家庭土地承包制度,既改善了农民的境遇,避免了土地兼并,又为工业化和城市化提供了源源不断的廉价劳动供给和土地供给。

在一个落后的农业国中,中国计划经济体制的建立是以城乡隔绝的二元经济结构为基础的,这就是实行了最严格的人口迁移管理和城乡户籍管治制度。中国经济改革的起步,不是去取消或直接冲击这种二元经济体制,而是在农村保存原来集体经济的框架下,引进了家庭土地承包制度,实现了中国历史上最平均的土地使用权和收益权,从而迅速地解决了在一个发展中国家的农业生产中的经济激励问题,大大提高了占人口绝大多数的农民的普遍福利水平。联产承包责任制的更大意义是它解放了原先被计划体制和集体生产方式所禁锢的农村劳动人口,从而诱发了一系列始料未及的连锁反应。  

首先,在解决了温饱问题之后,农民迅速从边际投入接近于零的单纯粮食生产向边际收益更高的经济作物和养殖业等农副产业转移投入,接着是创办乡镇企业,向离土不离乡的非农产业转移,再后是出现了全面向城市和工业转移的农民工劳动大军。农民工逐渐成为中国工人阶级的主体,既极大地冲击和动摇了原本僵化的国营企业的用工制度,又为工业化和城市化提供了源源不绝的廉价劳动供给。二元经济结构的存在和延续,包括数以亿计的农民工在工业和城市中的很少保障的非正规就业,和统分结合的家庭承包制提供的务工农民在家乡有一小块均分地的安全保障相配合,极大的降低了工业化和城市化的成本,造成了世界上最自由的竞争性劳动力市场。政府垄断征地使城郊土地改变用途的级差地租主要落到了城市政府手中,这样就为城市的迅速扩张和升级提供了财政来源。显然,劳动力的解放和自由流动,很少保障的非正规就业,作为最终保障的均分承包土地,垄断的城市化和工业化低价征地,是中国经济30年高速增长最重要源泉的之一。

四、中央集权下的财政分灶吃饭和地方竞争。

中国作为一个幅源辽阔、人口众多、发展极不平衡的大国,中央和地方的关系有史以来就是制约中国经济和社会发展的核心要素之一。1949年新中国成立以来,在中央和地方的关系,特别是权力划分上也是多次拉锯和反复。中国的改革开放,就是从放权让利开始,从大一统计划经济的一个大灶吃饭,改为分灶吃饭,中央和地方之间也是从1980年起,就“划分收支、分级包干”,其间几经变动,包括1994年在按照1993年中央和地方分成基数的基础上,实行不同比例的分税制,保证了中央财政收入的稳定增长和分成规则的透明性和稳定性,但中央和地方各级政府之间分灶吃饭则是改革以来一以贯之的大格局。

由于中央政府垄断了货币证券发行权和政府发债权,在中央给定的规则之下和之外,千方百计地组织地方政府掌握的其它全部可能的资源和增加财政收入成为各级地方政府谋求发展的唯一途径。在以经济建设为中心和发展是硬道理的这个改革开放总方针指引下,各级地方政府在一定程度上成为一个地方有限责任公司,统筹调动和配置地方各种资源,包括与上级政府及部门讨价还价、争取更多垂直资源。创造更有利于资本流入的外部条件,使用更有吸引力的财政税收返还和土地优惠,成为招商引资的主要手段。这样,在私人资本和外部资本以及劳动都自由流动的条件下,形成了独具特色的地方竞争。中央政府对统一市场的维护和对地方封锁的抑制,以及地方政府对外来资本的渴望,以及地方市、县一级政府的国企已经很少且一般退出了竞争性领域,大大削弱了地方竞争中的地方垄断和地方保护。地方所有制主导的资源整合与自由流动的劳动资本的组合,在一定程度上成为私人资本发育和规范不足的产权替代,它在丧失一部分效率的同时,又以规模经济和公平效应进行了补偿。从而使中央集权、统一市场下的地方竞争,成为推动中国经济增长的重要动力。

由此可见,中国30年的经济高速增长和社会发展,既不是简单模仿移植别人现有模式的结果,也不是其他人能够拷贝复制的普遍模式。

(作者简介:华生:北京师范大学教授;罗小朋:浙江大学中国农村发展研究院特聘教授;张学军:华夏认证中心研究院院长;边勇壮:大华大陆投资有限公司首席经济学家。他们均为孙冶方经济学奖获得者)

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宁要社会主义的草,不要资本主义的苗?

《二十一世纪》网络版 二○○八年十一月号 总第 80 期 2008年11月30日 

 

宁要社会主义的草,不要资本主义的苗?

⊙ 龚刃韧
 
 

  不久前,我偶然在「中国选举与治理」网站上看到北大法学院教授朱苏力的一篇文章,题为〈社会主义法治理念与资本主义法治思想的比较〉1。由于这些年我也在北大法学院给研究生讲授与法治有关的专题课,对朱苏力的文章从题目到内容都感到很荒谬。为了确认原文并找出「原出处」,通过首次进入中共中央政法委主办的「中国平安网」才了解到,原来这篇文章来自2008年6月17日朱苏力以「北京大学法学院院长」的头衔在中央政法委主办研讨班上所作专题讲座内容。除了大法官们、大检察官们外,「中央政法委机关全体同志及中央政法各部门有关同志听取了讲座」 2。可见,此专题讲座对中国司法界或政法界高层领导的影响应当是很直接的。

  又据2006年12月6日《人民日报》以及其他官方媒体相关报导,由中宣部、中央政法委、司法部及中国法学会联合举办「百名法学家百场报告会」,重点对各省党政干部、政法干警进行法治宣讲活动。朱苏力作为「百名法学家」之一,已到全国各省市巡回演讲了与上述讲座基本同样的观点。因此朱苏力在中央政法委的专题讲座内容并不是他临时发挥而是精心准备的结果。然而,由于朱苏力在有关法治及人权这些重大问题上有许多明显违反常识的错误,恐有误其长官和误人子弟(至少对北大法学院学生而言)之嫌,我觉得有必要在这里指出几点。    

一、法治理念是随消灭封建制度而产生的吗?

  朱苏力认为法治是欧洲消灭封建主义地方秩序之后才产生的,他这样说道:

「各自为阵「的小型社会秩序和法律无法满足商品交换对更大范围内的统一市场的要求,成为市场经济发展的一种障碍。新兴的资产阶级要实现其经济利益和政治理想,必须消灭封建主义地方秩序,在更大区域内形成统一的国家,并形成不矛盾的、明确的和普遍适用的规则体系。由此产生的法治的理念,隐含的也就是法律面前人人平等、法律的公平效率等等理念。    

  然而在欧洲历史上,法治(rule of law)的理念并不是在消灭封建制度之后产生的,而恰恰是在中世纪封建时代的英国出现的。1215年的英格兰《大宪章》(Magna Carta)被公认为法治原则的最重要历史渊源 3。《大宪章》主要是由封建大贵族及教士强迫滥用权力的国王约翰签署的文件,因而也是一个确认封建习惯和国王封臣的各种自由或权利的封建契约性文件。但《大宪章》首次明文规定了国王在法律之下并须服从法律的原则。英国宪法史学家梅特兰(F.W. Maitland)指出:当时的英国反叛贵族们「不是要求修改法律,而是要求遵守法律,特别是应由国王来遵守。…… 我们应注意如此长、详细和实际的文件意味著应该有一个法的统治(reign of law)的存在」4。 英国法史学家霍尔兹沃斯(W. Holdsworth)也指出《大宪章》所表明的一个原则,就是英王不是绝对君主,换句话说国王的权力不是绝对的。所以《大宪章》限制权力条款是第一次试图用法律用语准确表达立宪政府的重要思想 5。尽管《大宪章》并没有立即在英格兰确立法治,但却埋下了法治理念的种子,在经历了几个世纪后,终于在17世纪的英国光荣革命后得到确立和发展。

  在英格兰封建时代之所以能产生法治观念,原因在于英格兰具有比较特殊的封建社会经济结构:当时的英格兰既存在著比欧洲大陆国家更为强大和中央集权化的王权,同时也存在著能与国王抗衡的贵族势力。此外,在中世纪的欧洲,罗马教会与世俗君主并存的二元结构对削弱英王权起到了一定作用,所以也有教士代表参与了起草《大宪章》。正是在封建时期形成的法治传统对促成近代英国最早发展资本主义有著十分重要的作用。 

  朱苏力又认为「促成西方法治理念的另一个要素是现代民族国家的兴起和确立,表现为主权国家」,所以朱苏力这样讲道:

与基于传统和『君权神授』的封建国家不同,民族国家强调政治共同体,强调国家主权的至高无上,强调由国家制定和颁布统一的规则,强调国家为保证规则执行所必需的暴力的合法垄断。由此也就产生了主权至上、法律至上、依法治国的理念。

  事实上,在近代欧洲民族国家的产生并没有直接促成法治,相反却出现了君主专制的国家制度。「主权至上」与法治也是完全不同甚至相反的概念。近代以来欧洲多数国家都经历了从封建制走向中央集权制的历程,各国君主专制也达到高峰,17至18世纪就是欧洲绝对主义王政时期,而「君权神授」理论也正是在这一时代盛行。法国波旁王朝的君主专制是这个时代的典型代表 6。正因如此,才出现了英国光荣革命、启蒙思想运动和法国大革命以及其他国家的市民革命。在欧洲历史上,法治首先是在反对君主专制以及其他形式的专制过程中逐渐确立起来的。

二、卢梭是「法治学说的代表人物」吗?

  朱苏力在讲座中认为「法国资产阶级革命时期的法治学说的代表人物是孟德斯鸠和卢梭」。关于卢梭,朱苏力说道:

卢梭强调,法治的目的在于自由,但他的自由并不是消极的,而是任何公民都不能拒绝的;为实现真正的法治,卢梭甚至认为,应当强迫那些拒不服从公意的人服从公意,也就是要『迫使他们自由』。 

  卢梭是「法治学说的代表人物」吗?卢梭1762年在其政治哲学代表作《社会契约论》中提出来的一个最重要的观点就是「公意」(volonté générale)7。虽然「公意」被法国宪法学家让?里维罗(Jean Rivero)解释为大多数人的意志 8。 但是,由于卢梭把「公意」强调得至高无上,这就产生了以下结果。第一,在「公意」的最高指导之下,公民只有被迫服从的自由而没有真正的个人自由。第二,为了更好地表达「公意」,卢梭认为国家之内不能有派系存在。 第三,不能有派系意味著禁止结社自由和不允许反对派的合法存在。第四,卢梭认为「公意」最终出自一个天才的「伟大的立法者」(un grand législateur)9。 实际上,卢梭心目中的立法者不仅是超凡脱俗的天才,而且是一个神 10。绝对服从「公意」实际上就是服从一个非凡立法者的意志。可见,卢梭政治哲学的核心思想绝不是甚么「法治学说」,而是一种带有专制主义色彩的学说。法国大革命时期实行恐怖统治的雅各宾派主要领袖罗伯斯比尔就是卢梭的忠实信徒 11。罗伯斯比尔认为在革命时期采取恐怖统治是「严厉的、坚决的正义,从而它是美德的表现」12。 难怪英国哲学家罗素认为「希特勒是卢梭的一个结果」13。    

三、19世纪后半叶德国对法治有重要贡献吗?

  朱苏力认为19世纪的德国对法治有过「重要贡献」,他这样说道:

19世纪末,才通过铁血政策完成了德国的统一,进而完成了法治的统一。德国法治思想的一个重要贡献是「民族精神」,强调法治要在本国文化基础上回应本国需要;另一个思想是「法治国」,特别强调国家为公民提供福利性权利,在制度安排上则强调行政权力与行政行为的合法性和可预测性,强调严格执法。

  首先,虽然德国1871年统一并建立了德意志帝国(史称第二帝国),但德国的统一并不是「法治的统一」,因为统一后的德国并没有真正确立法治,而是承袭了专制的普鲁士邦宪法惯例。德国政治和军事领导仍然集中在皇帝(或其任命的首相)手中,首相只对皇帝负责,而不对议会负责。因此,尽管德国表面上采用了君主立宪并有了一定程度的司法独立,但在政治体制上还没有完全摆脱专制 14。事实上,1871年帝国宪法(亦称「俾斯麦宪法」)直到1918年一直被实施,其特征就是没有关于个人基本权利的规定。

  其次,所谓「民族精神」(Volksgeist)由18世纪德国哲学家赫尔德(J.G. Herder)提出15。19世纪德国法学家萨维尼(F.C. Savigny)受赫尔德影响,认为法律是一个土生土长的、自生自灭的非理性发展的过程,是「民族精神」的体现。生活在德国分裂状态下的萨维尼提到「民族精神」主要是为了创造一个「从民族→民族精神→国家精神→民族国家」的范式 16,与强调限制国家权力的法治理念毫无关系。事实上,在19世纪德国「民族精神」不仅没有对法治有过甚么重要贡献,反而浸透了国家主义、民族主义、泛日尔曼主义、种族主义、反犹太主义等精神17。 这种「民族精神」在很大程度上也是20世纪产生极权主义纳粹政权的一个重要的精神基础 18。

   再次,朱苏力认为19世纪德国对法治的另一贡献是「特别强调国家为公民提供福利性权利」。这大概是指1883至1889年铁血首相俾斯麦在任期间制定的几个社会保险立法。虽然这些社会保险措施对社会权的产生有过影响,但立法的主要目的是为了保全劳动力和消灭社会主义的影响,换句话说是德国政府在国会1878年通过《反社会党人非常法》,即镇压德国工人的社会主义政党之后而采取的社会安抚措施,所以与法治并无直接关系,更谈不上对法治的贡献。 

  最后,至于德国的「法治国」思想是否对法治有过贡献,这要看具体的历史时期。恰恰在19世纪后半叶德国的「法治国家」(rechtsstaat)理念发生了重要的变化,即由德国「民族精神」取代了自由主义,由实在法学取代了自然法学,原来的「法治国家」原理转变为「形式性法治国家」(formelle rechsstaatsbegriff)原理 19。据此,只要政府依法行政和法院依法审判,就是法治国家,而不必考虑法律本身的内容是否是压制个人自由。因此19世纪末德国版的「法治国家」就是「依法治国」或「依法律统治」(Regierung nach Gesetzen)20。

  1933年德国纳粹党获得政权以后的许多重大行为在形式上也都有法律作为依据。例如1933年废除代议制的《授权法》、确立纳粹一党制的《禁止新建政党法》、1935年迫害犹太人的《纽伦堡法》,等等。至少在形式上希特勒的纳粹德国也曾是「依法治国」。 可见,「依法治国」(rule by law)或「依法律统治」(Regierung nach Gesetzen)与法治(rule of law)有著本质的区别 21。

四、人权概念是因为欧洲国家小才出现的吗?

  朱苏力在讲座中有这样一段话:

而且由于欧洲的政治现实──国家较小,因经济社会发展水准不同各国公民权利不完全相同,当越来越多的各国公民因种种原因跨越国家之边界,无法诉诸公民权要求他国保护,这就催生了对个人权利有一种更为普遍化的表达,这就是最早的『人权』概念。

  看来,朱苏力认为欧洲国家由于国土较小,各国发展水准不同,为保护其在外国的本国公民的权利,所以才出现了人权概念。历史事实是这样吗?

  稍微有一点儿国际法常识的人都知道,外国人的法律地位与人权的国际保护是两个完全不同的领域:保护本国公民在外国的权利属于外国人法律地位问题,是传统国际法上早已存在的制度,特别是19世纪以后,西方工业化国家为了保护本国在外投资者的利益,十分强调保护本国在外公民的权利,因此外国人的法律地位问题成了传统国际法上国家责任制度的主要内容。人权的国际保护是第二次世界大战以后才进入国际法领域的。

  人权观念是近代以后首先在西方国家出现的。英国光荣革命后确立的法治为保障个人自由提供了最初的制度基础。英国思想家洛克将英国法治及其个人权利抽象为政治哲学上的普遍原理 22,因而是最早系统论述人权概念的思想家。1776年英属北美殖民地在反对英国殖民统治的独立战争过程中制定出了6 月12日《佛吉尼亚权利法案》、7月4日《独立宣言》等人类史上最早的人权法案和人权宣言。受北美权利法案影响,1789年8月26日法国大革命初期的国民制宪议会通过了《人和公民的权利宣言》23。因此,人权概念首先出现的地方并不都是「国家较小」的地方,更与保护本国在外国民无关。 

五、强调司法独立就会破坏中国法治建设吗?

  朱苏力在讲座中有一段特别引人注目的话:

还必须注意,在当下,至少有些国际势力并不希望中国强大和崛起,甚至希望中国分裂,想用西方的法治民主观来改革中国的政治法律结构。通过强调三权分立或片面强调司法独立来弱化党的领导,甚至排斥党的领导,其实是某些国际政治势力破坏中国社会主义建设和破坏中国法治建设的核心内容之一。对这一点,必须要有充分的警惕。

  尽管上述这段话显示出朱苏力有著相当敏锐的政治嗅觉,但却不禁令人回想起「文化大革命」中「四人帮」横行时的棍子式的语言。从冤假错案受害者和因非法定理由而被法院拒之门外的权利受侵害者的角度来看,朱苏力的这段话还让人联想到2008年四川地震大批中小学校舍倒塌导致成千上万学生死亡的事实披露后,知名文人余秋雨呼吁遇难学生家长不要请愿投诉以免成为「海外媒体反华宣传借口」的「含泪劝告」。

  我实在不能理解为甚么「片面」强调司法独立就会「弱化党的领导,甚至排斥党的领导」?难道强调司法独立还有「片面」和「全面」之分吗?难道包括宪法在内的中华人民共和国所有的法律不都是在中国共产党领导下制定的吗?难道中国现在还有反党的法律吗?难道法官遵循中国现行宪法第126条规定「依照法律规定独立行使审判权」就会产生反党的结果吗?

  我更不能理解为甚么强调司法独立怎么就成了「某些国际政治势力」「破坏中国法治建设的核心内容」?难道因为资本主义国家强调司法独立,所以中国自己就不能强调司法独立了吗?难道司法独立也有姓「资」姓「社」之分吗?实际上,就连社会主义理论的精神始祖卡尔?马克思对司法独立都有著非常肯定的态度。马克思明确指出:「法官除了法律就没有别的上司」(Der Richter hat keinen Vorgesetzten, als das Gesetz)24。难道在党章国宪上都表明信奉马克思主义的中国,法官还需要法律以外别的上司吗?难道中国的司法改革竟然要以反对强调司法独立为其特色吗?依我看,为了真正实现司法公正,在从制度上消除司法腐败和提高法官素质的过程中,确立司法独立应当是中国司法改革的基本目标。反对强调司法独立才会导致破坏中国的法治建设,更何况中国自身的法治建设本来就不是为了给外国人展示的。 

  在现代国际社会,作为人权司法保护的前提──司法独立已经成为政治文明的标志之一。例如,「作为所有人民和所有国家努力实现的共同标准」 的1948年联合国《世界人权宣言》第10条规定:

人人完全平等地有权由一个独立而无偏倚的法庭进行公正的和公开的审讯,以确定他的权利和义务并判定对他提出的任何刑事指控。

1998年10月5日中国政府签署的1966年《公民及政治权利国际公约》第14条第1款也有类似的规定。显然,《世界人权宣言》和《公民及政治权利国际公约》都要求各国采取司法独立的制度,以保证每个人都能享有公正审判的权利。

  司法独立是法治的核心内容之一,也是衡量一个国家是否确立法治的一个重要指标。在文明社会享受公正审判是每个人的基本权利。但没有司法独立就不可能有司法公正,这不仅是中外历史的普遍教训,也是文明社会的一个基本常识。中华人民共和国成立以来,在缺乏司法独立方面就有著很深刻的历史教训。

  例如,在1957年中国共产党号召党外人士帮助党整风时,法学界、政治学界不少有识之士都由于提出反对以党代政,提倡法治以及强调司法独立等建议 25,而被划为「右派」分子,受到长期的政治迫害。同样,在司法界包括最高人民法院及最高人民检察院在内也有一大批坚持独立审判的法官及秉公执法的检察官被划为右派分子,受到批判和打击。当时连重述1954年宪法第78条「人民法院独立进行审判,只服从法律」规定都会构成「右派言论」。由于没有法治,相当数量的「右派」分子未经任何司法程式就丧失了人身自由,被强制劳动教养二十年之久。26

  又如,在「文化大革命」时期,法院更不可能独立进行审判,因而出现了大量的冤假错案。在这10年中,各级法院共判处了刑事案件126万件,其中「反革命」案件28万件,普通刑事案件98万件。经过「文革」后覆审,所谓「反革命」案件绝大部分都属于错判,普通刑事案件的10%也属于错判 27。所有这些显然都是没有司法独立的情况下造成的惨痛的历史教训。更不用说「文革」期间全国各处都有私设公堂的普遍现象。真不知有多少人成了枪下冤魂!也不知多少家庭从此家破人亡!

  即使中国实行经济改革开放政策以来,因缺乏司法独立以及司法腐败引起的司法不公现象一直是广大民众极为不满的社会焦点问题,同时也是中国社会不稳定或不和谐的原因之一。作为一名中国的法学工作者应该很好地反思现代中国社会的这些历史教训。在晚年进行反思的文艺理论家王元化就曾指出,中国学术界存在的主要通病就是在谈问题时常常脱离历史的教训,因而所谓的「学术性研究」也变成了戏论 28。我以为作为中国的法学者,更需要的是常识和良知,而不是政治嗅觉。

六、甚么是「社会主义法治理念」?

  朱苏力讲座的主要篇幅是讲「社会主义法治理念」。对此,朱苏力有这样一段话:

社会主义法治理念是在中国社会主义建设和发展中,特别是在改革开放的经济、社会发展中,在当代中国政治和法治实践过程中逐渐形成与发展起来,是对中国法治建设的经验教训的一个初步总结。这一理念与中国,与社会主义,以及与法治分不开。 

  这段话是把对中国的法治建设的经验总结等同于「社会主义法治理念」。这也似乎等于说凡是当代中国的政治和法律实践都是社会主义法治实践。难道中国已成了社会主义的化身?朱苏力的这个论点不过是一种回圈式的自己证明自己,也是「存在即合理」的黑格尔哲学的歪用。朱苏力在讲座反复多次强调社会主义或中国要走社会主义道路,但都没有对甚么是「社会主义」做出解释。问题在于对「社会主义」这一概念都不清楚,为甚么非要在法治之前冠以「社会主义」的名称呢?

  朱苏力在讲座中间接引用了邓小平关于一部分先富起来以及共同富裕的话29。中国改革开放三十年来,随著经济持续高速增长告别了过去平均主义式的普遍贫困和封闭的时代。与此同时,一部分人也确实先富起来。然而,中国还远远没有实现「共同富裕」,却成为世界上贫富两级分化最为严重的国家之一。中国社会各阶层贫富之间的巨大差别至少远远超过所有西方资本主义国家。因此,从「共同富裕」的角度来看,在中国社会主义还只是一种可望而不可即的美好理想。

  1989年5月16日,邓小平在会见苏共中央总书记戈巴契夫时坦诚地说道:「多年来,存在一个对马克思主义、社会主义的理解问题。……经过二十多年的实践,回过头来看,双方都讲了许多空话。马克思去世以后一百多年,究竟发生了甚么变化,在变化的条件下,如何认识和发展马克思主义,没有搞清楚」30。 既然对马克思主义都没有搞清楚,自然对甚么是社会主义也不会搞得很清楚了。

  过去中国主要受苏联模式影响,误以为社会主义就是计划经济、公有制、按劳分配、一党制领导等那一套原则和制度。但是这些曾被认为正统的原则和制度,除了维持党的领导之外,其他都被中国近年来的实践部分地或全部地否定了。例如,中国在计划经济没有取消的情况下也引入了有中国特色的市场经济体制。中国现在不仅允许发展私有制,而且数十万亿元的国有企业资产也以各种形式被转移到少数私人手中(其中不乏国企领导、各级党政官员及其子孙)。按劳分配也体现为按权力、按资本、按等级、按身份地位分配。据财经方面媒体报导,从2008年以后的几年之内,中国以国有企业为主的上市公司有上10万亿元的内部股及原始股被陆续解禁,将以现金的形式流入少数人的腰包 31。这是在任何时代的资本主义国家都无法想象的掠夺现象!由于中国缺乏对权力的有效制约,早已变成社会主人的「社会公仆」们滥用职权、享受特权以及腐败程度也远远超过所有西方资本主义国家的政府官员。根据总部设在柏林的国际透明组织(Transparency International)历年的年度报告,中国在廉洁程度上排行榜上始终明显地落在西方资本主义国家后面 32。所以,若从公平正义的角度来判断,大概谁都说不清楚究竟甚么才是社会主义了。难怪历经百年沧桑的103岁的学者周有光这样写道:「社会主义没有公认定义。谁是社会主义国家,只能以『自称』来认定,不管别国是否同意」33。

  由此可见,在朱苏力的讲座中,所谓「社会主义法治理念」本身就是一个缺少明确定义的概念。难怪朱苏力在讲「社会主义法治理念」时也只是对「社会主义」继续说著空话。

  关于中国法治实践的经验教训,朱苏力提到的几条总结更像一篇政治报告:即第一是「必须依法治国」;第二是「必须执政为民」;第三是「必须公平正义」;第四是「要求法治服务大局」;第五是「必须坚持党的领导」。如果这几条是由中国执政党领导人从政治的角度提出来的,那是容易理解的。但朱苏力却试图从法学的角度对这几条任意地加以发挥,结果弄巧成拙只能给政治领导人起帮倒忙的作用。

  就中国而言,虽然提出「依法治国」(rule by law)相对于无法可依、有法不依以及以言代法是一个历史进步,但与国际社会公认的法治(rule of law)仍然有区别。「执政为民」不是法学用语,而是政治领导人的主张或承诺,与民主还有明显的差距。至于「公平正义」的概念早在两千多年前就被古希腊哲学家们提出,此后长期为西方哲学、法学、伦理学以及神学上的议论主题,而在中国只是在贫富差距越来越悬殊的最近才得到强调。朱苏力还以「居港权」这一未必恰当的例子来解释「顾全大局」,即司法判决在一定情况下应让位于政策或政治的考虑 34。 至于「坚持党的领导」,按照朱苏力的逻辑却得出不能「片面」强调司法独立的奇怪结论。 

  总之,说来说去,朱苏力根本就没有对「社会主义法治理念」说清楚,通篇都是对领导人意志的揣摩和恣意诠释,并散发著蔑视法治的气息。正因如此,朱苏力也无法对他的讲座主题「社会主义法治理念」与「资本主义法治思想」的区别讲清楚。

  下面,就让我们看看朱苏力是如何对法治的所谓两种理念进行区别的,他这样说道:  

社会主义法治理念和资本主义法治理念有历史的继承,但也有一些重大、根本的差别。重大差别的形成,并非简单的是法律思想、文化传统不同,甚至也不完全因为社会制度或意识形态不同,因为社会主义法治仍然借鉴了也可以借鉴资本主义法治的某些经验;归根结底,从历史唯物主义的观点来看,根本区别在于不同的法治实践回答的是不同时代不同国家的法治根本问题不完全相同,有些甚至有重大分歧。

  本来,从历史发展的角度来看社会主义应是一种区别于资本主义的社会制度和意识形态,但朱苏力却认为「社会主义法治理念」与「资本主义法治理念」之间的重大差别「不完全因为社会制度或意识形态不同」,这就充分暴露了朱苏力的命题本身就是一个伪命题,因为朱苏力已从根本上否定了自己提出区别两个理念的基本前提。可见,朱苏力所强调的「社会主义法治理念」与「资本主义法治理念」之间的区别完全是机会主义的,且带有明显的政治动机。

  那么,「社会主义法治理念」与「资本主义法治理念」之间的根本区别究竟在哪儿呢?按照朱苏力的说法:「根本区别在于不同的法治实践回答的是不同时代不同国家的法治根本问题不完全相同」。这种故弄玄虚式的病句,也许只有朱苏力自己才能读懂。

七、作为国际社会共识的法治理念

  2008年2月2日中国政府首次发表的《中国的法治建设》(白皮书)明确承认:「法治是政治文明发展到一定历史阶段的标志,凝结著人类智慧,为各国人民所向往和追求」。

  作为人类文明发展成果和国际社会共识的法治理念的内容主要包括:在法律制度上对国家或其政府以及一切公权力进行限制和控制,任何掌握公权力的机关、组织和官员都必须严格遵守法律,对严重违法的官员无论职务多高都可追究司法责任;未经法律程式不得剥夺任何人的自由;任何人在其权利受到侵害后都有权寻求司法补救及其他方式的补救;司法独立以及律师自治,等等。

  与此同时,真正的法治还必须是良法之治,而判断是良法还是恶法的标准就在于是法律是保障个人自由还是压制个人自由。压制自由的法律尽管有法律的形式,但实质上是违反法治精神的。对此,卡尔?马克思曾明确指出:「法(Recht)是自由的肯定存在」。而压制自由的「书报检查制度正如奴隶制一样,即使它千百次地作为法律(Gesetz)而存在,也永远不能成为合法的」35。

  上述这些关于法治的共识不仅可从由各国法学家、法官和律师组成的国际法学家委员会(International Commission of Jurists)的1955年《雅典决议》和1959年《德里宣言》36 以及从国际律师协会、泛美律师协会、泛太平洋律师协会、美国律师协会、国际工会联合会等组织于2007年发起的「世界正义工程」(the World Justice Project)里找到依据 37,而且还可以从联合国文件中找到依据。

  例如,2002年联合国人权事务委员会增进和保护人权小组委员会的文件就对法治作了明确的解释:法治的主要特征是利用法律限制和控制权力的使用,以保障自由。为此,法治要求至少从三个方面来限制国家权力:第一是物质限制,涉及尊重和保障基本自由和人权;第二是职能限制,采用分权形式;第三是时间限制,其表现形式为人民的意志通过自由和公正的选举来定期重新表达 38。

  第二次世界大战以后,作为国际共识的法治理念通过一系列国际人权条约特别是1966年《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》进一步详细地体现出来。因此,作为国际社会共识的法治不应该有姓「社」姓「资」的问题。

  然而,对于作为国际社会共识和政治文明标志的法治理念,朱苏力似乎一直不大认同。朱苏力是以译介美国法学家波斯纳(R.A. Posner)的法律经济分析理论和提倡所谓中国的「法治及其本土资源」而在相对闭塞的内地法学界知名的,同时也在某种程度上迎合了国内近年来更加显现的崇美媚外和民族主义混杂的社会风气。波斯纳的法律经济分析是一个没有伦理学基础的实用主义法学理论,其特点是偏重经济效率(追求财富最大化)并漠视公平正义和人的尊严,因而在美国本土受到部分右翼的或保守的政客及财阀的赏识,但也成为受美国法学界批判最多的学说(所以引证率也最高)39 。恐怕波斯纳本人做梦都不会想到他那套理论竟然在信奉社会主义的中国被追随者们捧红起来。

  倘若朱苏力仅限于应用波斯纳的理论,为减少「交易费用」而提倡利用中国(非司法诉讼形式的)民间传统方式解决邻里之间「私权的冲突」,那也就又当别论了。但是,朱苏力对中国的「本土资源」明确冠以「法治」的前提,而且从朱苏力的一些论点特别是对陕西省「黄碟案」的著名评论可以清楚地看出他所说的「本土资源」确实与公权力有著密切的联系。

  所谓「黄碟案」是指2002年8月18日陕西省延安市宝塔区警方接到电话举报说有一对夫妻在其住所看色情(成人)影碟,四名员警在没有出示警官证、搜查证和逮捕证的情况下于夜间突然闯入这对夫妻的卧室强行搜查和抓人 40 。虽然事后当地警方已向当事人赔礼道歉和经济补偿,但朱苏力仍然认为 「员警干预有合法基础」,因为这对夫妻在家看「黄碟」「侵犯了」那个举报人「不看黄碟的权利」,是举报人为了减少「交易费用」而「打电话让警方干预」的,因此「是两个私权的冲突」41。然而,没有任何证据表明举报人「不看黄碟的权利」受到了侵犯,因为该举报人并没有被要求共同观看「黄碟」,被举报的那对夫妻也不可能对邻里公开播放「黄碟」,所以不排除该举报人是那对夫妻隐私偷窥者的可能性。尽管如此,朱苏力坚持从他杜撰出来的举报人的「权利」受到「侵犯」出发,引伸出员警即使违反法律程式侵犯公民私生活也具有「正当性」的结论。朱苏力对待政府及其员警行使公权力的态度也由此可见一斑。

  无论从法理还是从道德角度来看,朱苏力的论点都不值得一驳。但值得人们注意的是,朱苏力在这里「活学活用」美国人波斯纳法律经济分析理论,以减少「交易费用」为由将「私权的冲突」与公权力「巧妙」地联系起来。这就暴露出朱苏力提倡所谓中国「法治及其本土资源」的一大特色:即只要存在「私权的冲突」并由「冲突」一方「举报」或告密,公权力的行使就具有不受法律约束的「合法基础」和「正当性」,就可以任意侵犯「冲突」另一方的个人权利和自由。这哪里是法治的「本土资源」?这分明是专制和极权的「本土资源」!

  现在的问题是朱苏力提倡的所谓中国「法治及其本土资源」与他本人在中共中央政法委研讨班讲座的内容有甚么联系呢?所谓中国的「法治及其本土资源」到底应该姓「社」还是姓「资」呢?朱苏力所提倡的中国法治的「本土资源」主要源于中国历史上形成的「民间法」或地方民俗,因而可惜不大好归属于朱苏力反复突出强调「坚持共产党的领导」为特色的「社会主义法治理念」了,但恐怕更不能归属于强调遵守法律程式和尊重个人自由的「资本主义法治思想」。

  中国自秦始皇统一中国以来两千多年的历史是一部专制的历史,皇权至上而不受法律约束,辅弼皇权的官僚统治阶层也拥有任意欺压人民的各种特权,作为被统治的大多数人从无个人自由和权利可言。中国先秦时期出现的儒家提倡「人治」、「德治」而毫无法治理念,而以韩非为代表的法家虽然也曾提到「法治」一词 42 ,但这种「法治」只不过是为专制君主提供的主要以严刑峻法和阴谋权术来驾驭臣民的统治手段而已。因此中国法家的所谓「法治」实际上是君主专制的代名词。在我看来,中国从来都没有过法治的「本土资源」,但却非常富有专制主义的「本土资源」,因为法治不仅是人治的对立物,更是专制的对立物。 

  朱苏力在讲座中强调:「坚持社会主义法治理念,尽管不能神经过敏,但一定要保持一定的政治警惕和政治敏感」。朱苏力一方面对在反专制过程中形成的「资本主义法治思想」保持著近似神经过敏的「政治警惕和政治敏感」,而另一方面却对有著长期专制历史的中国「法治及其本土资源」情有独钟。孰先进孰落后,大概不必给出答案了。再有,尽管朱苏力所说的「社会主义法治理念」与他主张的中国法治「本土资源」有本质上的不同,但却都有一个共同点,就是要抵制作为国际社会共识的法治理念。

结论:法治、人权不是资本主义国家专利品 

    法治与人权都是人类文明长期发展的产物,尽管一些观念及制度在历史上首先出现在西方国家,但并不因此而成为西方资本主义国家的专利品。1948年《世界人权宣言》序言指出:

鉴于为使人类不致迫不得已铤而走险对暴政和压迫进行反叛, 有必要使人权受法治的保护。 

  显然,《世界人权宣言》所提到的法治既不姓「资」也不姓「社」,而是指作为国际社会共识的法治。人类近代以来的历史经验也告诉我们:只有确立法治,国家才能实现长治久安;只有在确立法治的国家,人权才能受到有效的保护。

  应该承认,西方资本主义国家历史发展过程中积累的经验教训中既有「糟粕」也有「精华」。前者如西欧各国资本原始积累过程中剥夺农民土地的「羊吃人」的圈地运动、工业化时期的血汗工厂制度、童工制度、19世纪70年代以前对劳动者结社自由的普遍压制、以及直至第二次世界大战前尤其在美国社会显著存在的弱肉强食的社会达尔文主义,等等。后者如限制政府权力、司法独立、新闻出版自由、民主选举制度,等等。

  令人遗憾的是,这些年来中国社会把西方资本主义国家自身早已抛弃的许多「糟粕」都毫无保留地捡过来发挥「余热」。但奇怪的是,朱苏力主张「社会主义法治理念」并不是为了对西方资本主义历史上的「糟粕」在当代中国社会的泛滥现象提出警告,而是专门为了对以司法独立、保障人权为主要内容的「资本主义法治思想」提出「必须要有充分的警惕」。 

  学习和借鉴外国的先进制度和经验并不等于要简单移植某一特定外国模式或照搬某个外国人的理论,应该考虑到中国的国情,但不能因此就拒斥一切国家先进的制度和经验。当然,对于某些西方国家在人权方面采用双重标准的外交政策,或者利用民主、人权等口号追求本国利益并违反国际法(例如美国布希政府为了控制石油资源于2003年发动对伊拉克的军事入侵),那就应区别对待了。 

  然而,特别是对于许多已形成国际共识的理念或人类进步文明的价值如法治、人权、民主等,如果统统都贴上「资本主义」的标签加以排斥,那只是自甘落后的虚弱或愚昧的表现。如果再对某些落后和愚昧现象又贴上中国特色「社会主义」的标签,那就是对社会主义这一崇高理想的亵渎。

  简而言之,朱苏力的这篇讲座稿从头到尾既没有讲清甚么是「社会主义法治理念」,也没有讲清甚么是「资本主义法治思想」,甚至对法治和人权这些基本概念都缺乏起码的常识!因此,朱苏力没有也不可能对所谓「社会主义法治理念与资本主义法治思想的比较」这一题目提出有说服力的论证,其结果只能让人回想起中国「文化大革命」时期流行的那句荒唐口号:宁要社会主义的草,不要资本主义的苗。

 

注释 
1 通常在该网站首页登出的文章都要停留数天,但朱苏力这篇文章很快就被撤出首页了。我注意到文章后面线民的评语几乎都是批评性的且还相当尖锐,这也许是该文被迅速撤出首页的原因?中国选举与治理网站,http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=130716 
 
2 中国平安网站,http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/pabb/2008-06/17/content_48588.htm  
3 Select Documents of English Constitutional History, Edited by G.B.Adams and H.R.Stephens (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1910), 42-52.  
4 F.W.Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, Edited by H.A.L.Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1908), 15.  
5 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol.2, 4th Edition (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd., 1936), 216.  
6 [英] 布蓝达?拉尔夫?路易斯(B.R. Lewis)著,荣予、方力维译:《君主制的历史》(北京:三联书店,2007),页79。  
7 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social: ou, principes du droit politique(1762)(Paris: Editions Garnier Freres, 1962, 246-247.   
8 Jean Rivero, Les droits de l’homme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1978), 48.   
9 J.-J. Rousseau, Du contrat social: ou, principes du droit politique, 252-253; 260-263.  
10 [法] 爱米尔?涂尔干(E.Durkheim)著,李鲁宁译:《孟德斯鸠与卢梭》(上海:上海人民出版社,2003),页105-108。  
11 在罗伯斯庇尔当政时期,卢梭的遗体被决定应当被奉祀入先贤祠。罗伯斯庇尔获得了欧洲任何一个君主都不能与他相提并论的绝对权力。[英] 阿克顿(E.E.D.Acton)著,秋风译:《法国大革命讲稿》(贵阳:贵州人民出版社,2004),页308-309。 
12 [法] 罗伯斯比尔(M. Robespierre)著,赵涵舆译:《革命法制与审判》(北京:商务印书馆,1965),页176。  
13 [英] 罗素(B.Russell)著,马元德译:《西方哲学史》下卷(北京:商务印书馆,1976),页225。  
14 与英国、美国等国家相比,19世纪德国司法独立程度仍然较低,例如法院院长几乎全都是由前从属于政府的公务员、检察官来担任的,因此与政府有特别密切的联系。候补法官可以根据司法部长的决定被解雇或调离,他们的职业生涯完全依赖于上级法官的善意。德国法官只是工资很低的公务员。F. Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society (Leamington Spa; Dover, NH.: Berg, 1986), pp.260-262. [德] 卡尔?艾利希?博恩(K.E.Born) 等著,张载杨等译:《德意志史》第三卷上(北京:商务印书馆,1991),页279-283。 
15 [美] J.W. 汤普森(J.W. Thompson)著,孙秉莹、谢德风译:《历史著作史》下卷,第三分册(北京:商务印书馆,1996),页180-188。  
16 黎四奇:〈对萨维尼「民族精神」的解读与评价〉,《德国研究》2006年第2期,页59-63。   
17 [德] 克劳斯?费舍尔(K.P. Fischer)著,萧韶工作室译:《纳粹德国:一部新的历史》上册(南京:江苏人民出版社,2005),页22-47;克劳斯?费舍尔(K.P. Fischer)著,钱坤译:《德国反犹史》(南京:江苏人民出版社,2007),页104-132。
18 [美] 威廉?夏伊勒(W.L.Shirer)著,董乐山 等译:《第三帝国的兴亡──纳粹德国史》上(北京:世界知识出版社,1979),页141。  
19 Ernst-Wolfgang B?ckenf?rde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit : Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp, 1991), 149-150.   
20 Ibid., 153; 又参见郑永流:《法治四章》(北京:中国政法大学出版社,2002),页103。 
21 事实上,德国直到第二次世界大战以后,基于对纳粹极权体制的反省,重新审视19世纪后半叶变质的「法治国家」理念,经过制定联邦德国《基本法》及建立宪法法院,才开始对法治做出自己的贡献,因而进入被称之为「公正法治国」的时代。郑永流,《法治四章》,页130-146。  
22 [英] 洛克(John Locke)著,叶启芳、瞿菊农译:《政府论》下篇(北京:商务印书馆,1964),页5-6;59-61;77-80。 
23 然而,尽管有18世纪末的权利法案或人权宣言,西方国家并没有真正保障所有人的权利和自由,而是长期偏重保障部分人的特权,即男人的特权、白种人的特权、富人的特权以及殖民主义者的特权。直到第二次世界大战以前,即使在西方国家也谈不上对人权的普遍尊重。龚刃韧:〈关于人权与国际法若干问题的初步思考〉,《中外法学》1997年第5期,页23-24。  
24 Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)(Berlin : Dietz, 1975), Bd.I, 154.  
25 北京大学法律系国家与法的理论教研室编:《政法战线上的右派言论汇集》(1957年12月印),页5;231;241;249;256。  
26 反右运动之后,本来就不存在司法独立的中国司法走向了更加错误的方向。1958年在「大跃进」时,司法机关在办理案件中,不再各司其职,各负其责,遵循法律程式,「公、检、法」机关一度合并为「政法公安部」,联合办案。仅仅推行两年的律师制度也被废除。1960年还取消了检察院。杨一凡、陈寒枫 主编:《中华人民共和国法制史》(哈尔滨:黑龙江人民出版社,1997),页780-782。  
27 同上书,页787。  
28 王元化:《沉思与反思》(上海:上海辞书出版社,2007),页40。  
29 这是邓小平1985年10月23日会见美国时代公司组织美国高级企业家代表团时对提问的回答,原话如下:「只要我国经济中公有制占主体地位,就可以避免两级分化。当然,一部分地区、一部分人可以先富起来,带动和帮助其他地区、其他的人逐步达到共同富裕」《邓小平文选》第三卷(北京:人民出版社,1993),页149。  
30 同上书,页291。  
31 苏培科:〈平准基金未必救得了中国股市〉,《中国经济时报》2008年11月11日;任洪剑:〈大小非真正的压力还未来临〉,《证券市场红周刊》2008年9月13日,引自和讯网站,http://stock.hexun.com/2008-09-13/108831123.html/  
32 http://www.transparency international. org /publications /annual report/  
33 周有光:〈人类历史的演进轨道〉(2008年7月12日),中国选举与治理网站,http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=130977   
34 朱苏力以「居港权」为例谈所谓中国法治经验只能更引起香港法律界的反感和不愉快回忆。1999年1月29日,香港终审法院在「吴嘉玲诉入境事务处处长」和「陈雅锦诉入境处处长」两案终局裁决中,认为基本法第22条的立法本意是容许居港未满七年的人在内地所生的子女享有居港权,因此香港人所生子女都享有居港权,不论婚生或非婚生,亦不论是否生于中国。同年6月26日,在担心人口压力过大的香港特区政府请求下,中国人大常委会对《基本法》第22条作出解释,只有香港人在内地所生婚生子女才享有居港权,非婚生子女及出生时父或母仍未成为香港居民的则没有居港权,因而基本否定了香港终审法院的判决。这个人大常委会的解释在香港遭到许多法律界人士的批评,认为违反司法独立和侵犯人权,并担忧香港的法治受到动摇。  
35 Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe, p.150.  
36 The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report on the International Congress of Jurists (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959), 2-14.  
37 The World Justice Project, http://www.abnet.org/wjp/  
38 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/36, 6, para.22.  
39 中国大陆法学者对波斯纳的理论主要限于译介或其应用,而对这一理论本身缺乏分析和批判,比较起来台湾的法学者林立对波斯纳理论的研究更值一读。林立:《波斯纳与法律经济分析》(上海:上海三联书店,2005),页79;101;221;411;413-433;439;459。  
40 该案具体案情如下:2002年8月18日陕西省延安市宝塔区公安分局万花乡派出所民警根据一个告密者有关一对夫妻在其住所看淫秽录影的电话举报,在晚上11点左右突然进入这对夫妻住所,带走了丈夫张某并将从现场搜到的3张淫秽光碟连同电视机、影碟机一起带回派出所。经过扣押财物、将张某刑事拘留,11月5日被刑拘16天之后的张某被宝塔公安分局以取保候审的形式释放回家。12月5日下午,宝塔公安分局解除对张某的取保候审,并宣布撤销该案。12月25日,张某向宝塔公安分局提出国家赔偿申请书,并要求公安机关恢覆名誉、赔礼道歉,处理相关责任人。  
41 朱苏力:〈当代中国法理学的普性及不足〉(西南政法大学五十周年学术讲座),中国民商法律网站,http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=13261。此文后来还刊载在北大法学院《中外法学》2003年第3期,页287以后。  
42 对韩非思想的分析,可参见《顾准文集》(贵阳:贵州人民出版社,1994),页399-401;又参见王元化,前引书,页168-203。

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